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NOTES
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS AND
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:
PRESERVING ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS
BY ANALYZING THE NATURE
OF THE PANEL
State legislatures have responded to the spiraling costs of
medical malpractice insurance by enacting laws to encourage outof-court settlement of malpractice claims. Over twenty states have
enacted Medical Malpractice Panel (MMP) laws that require plaintiffs to submit malpractice claims to a panel before bringing suit
in state court.' The panel's findings usually are not binding, and
the parties may seek a trial de novo after the MMP proceeding.2
Nonetheless, plaintiffs have sought to circumvent these statutes by
filing malpractice claims directly in federal court.
The courts have disagreed about whether the application of
MMP laws impermissibly impairs federal diversity jurisdiction.
One court focused on whether the panel resembled a judicial or
administrative body, and, concluding that it was closely akin to a
court, held that states may not require plaintiffs who meet the
requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction to proceed first in a
quasi-state court.3 Most courts,4 however, have analyzed attempts
I See

Note, Mandatoy State Malpractice Arbitration Boards and the Erie Problem: Edelson v.

Soricelli, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562 n.2 (1980); Note, The Confrontation Between State
Compulsory Medical Malpractire Screening Statutes and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 546, 548 n.5; notes 18, 19, and accompanying text infra.
The statutes in nine states merely provide frameworks for the state administration of
whatever dispute resolution procedure the parties agree upon. See A.A. CODE §§ 6-5-584
(1975); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38-19b to
19f (1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-402 to 424 (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10,
§§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981), declared unconstitutional, Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2801 to
2809 (Supp. 1980-81); MICH. Comfp. LAWs ANN. §§ 500.3054 to .3056 (Supp. 1980-81); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25b-1 to -26 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 7001 to 7008
(Supp. 1980).
Although a claimant may immediately bring an action in court in Arkansas and New
Hampshire, he has the option of initially bringing the claim before a panel. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-2601 to 2612 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-A:1-10 (1974).
2 See notes 18, 19, and accompanying text infra.
3 Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 222-23 (D.R.I. 1978). See also Edelson v.
Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 141-46 (3d Cir. 1979) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
Plaintiffs have also alleged that MMP statutes violate due process, equal protection,
separation of powers, and the right to trial by jury. Some have argued that the laws create
a conflict of interest when panelists are physicians and violate state laws requiring that
judges be elected. One or more of these arguments failed in the following cases: Woods v.
Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979) (Florida MMP law); Seoane v. Ortho
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to circumvent MMP laws without characterizing the nature of the
panel and have held that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 5 and its progeny require plaintiffs to follow the state procedure before suing in
federal court.
This Note suggests a methodology for courts to use in examining the conflict between MMP laws and the federal courts'
free exercise of their diversity jurisdiction. When determining
whether to apply the MMP law, federal courts should initially
focus on the nature of the panel. Whether MMP laws undermine
the choice of judicial forums guaranteed by the federal diversity
jurisdiction statute 6 by requiring plaintiffs to submit claims first to
a state court is an essential element of a balancing of federal and
state interests. Because of the differences among MMP statutes,
however, this Note refrains from uniformly characterizing these

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. La. 1979) (Louisiana MMP law); Hines v.
Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Indiana MMP law); Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (en banc); Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978);
Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 246 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Kletnieks v. Brookhaven Mem. Ass'n, 53 A.D.2d 169,
385 N.Y.S.2d 575 (2d Dep't 1976); Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744
(Sup. Ct. 1976); Parker v. Childrens Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978), overruled,
Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); State ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.
2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
But see Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (Arizona MMP bonding requirement violated state privileges and immunities clauses); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.
2d 231 (Fla. 1980)(Florida MMP statute violates due process clauses of federal and state
constitutions); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976) (Illinois MMP act violated state constitutional provisions vesting judicial power in the
state courts and granting tight to trial by jury); Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (Missouri MMP statute violated state constitutional right to open courts); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976) (Ohio MMP law violated equal protection and right to trial by
jury) (dicta); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. 1976) (Ohio
MMP law treating medical malpractice claims and other tort claims differently violated
equal protection) (dicta); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980) (Pennsylvania
MMP violated state constitutional right to trial by jury).
See generally Note, The Constitutional Considerationsof Medical Malpractice Screening Panels,
27 ANM.U.L. REV. 161 (1977); Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 TENN. L. REV. 607 (1979); 9 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 679 (1978); 53 TUL L.
REv. 640 (1979).
4 See, e.g., DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.
1980); Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 617 F.2d 361-362 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Edelson v.
Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979).
- 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). For a discussion of the possible supremacy clause implications of MMP statutes, see notes 64-65 infra.
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within which
statutes; rather, it proposes an analytical framework
7
courts can examine the peculiarities of each law.
I
STRUCTURE OF STATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS

Mandatory MMP laws are diverse. The statutes authorize
malpractice arbitration panels of from three to seven 8 attorneys,9
health care professionals,' 0 laymen," or arbitrators.1 2 Frequently, state court judges serve on the panels. 13 In most states a
state judge,' 4 an administrator,' 5 or the parties themselves 16 select
the members. Panel proceedings are generally informal, although
some statutes import state judicial rules of evidence and procedure. 17 Some statutes require aggrieved parties to seek an arbi' But see Note, 1980 DUKE L.J., supra note I (arguing MMP statutes need not be
applied by federal courts).
I See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1002 (1979) (four member panel when claim involves hospital); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-17 (D) (1978) (six member panel consisting of three attorneys and three health care providers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301-308(b) (Purdon Supp.
1980-81) (seven member panel consisting of three members of the public, two attorneys,
and two health care providers), declared unconstitutional, Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190
(Pa. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3406 (Supp. 1979) (panel consisting of one attorney,
one physician and one member of the public). Some states allow the parties to agree to
present the case before a single arbitrator. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-2A-04 (e) (1980).
9 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-01 (Supp. 1979) (attorneys comprise two members of panel).
10 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (C) (West Supp. 1980) (panel consisting
of one non-voting attorney, one physician chosen by each of the parties, and a third physician selected by the parties' doctors).
11 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6804 (a) (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.0215
(1) (Vernon Supp. 1979), declared unconstitutional, Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-01 (Supp. 1979)
(panel including "one citizen member who shall represent health care consumers").
12 MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-03(c) (1980).
13 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567B(1) (Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(2) (West
Supp. 1980), declared unconstitutional, Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.025.1 (Vernon
Supp. 1980) (circuit judge comprising one nonvoting member), declared unconstitutional,
Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-80). Cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-1 (Supp. 1979)
(one panel member entitled a "special master").
11 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(B) (Supp. 1979); N.Y. JUD. LAW 148-a (McKinney
Supp. 1979-80); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 10-19-1 (Supp. 1979).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6805 (Supp. 1978); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41A.030 (1979);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.03 (West 1980).
1" IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3 (Burns Supp. 1980).
1'7 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.307, 1301.506 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81)
(panel bound by rules of evidence and state common and statutory law), declared unconstitutional, Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
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trated decision before filing with the court; 1I others require filing
with the court before arbitration. 19
The powers of MMPs also vary. Some states authorize panels
to determine the liability of the medical professional,2 0 while
others limit the panel's authority to determining specific questions
of fact. 21 Still others empower panels to rule on the extent of the
23
plaintiff's disability 22 and to award damages.
Although some statutes label the review process "arbitration, 2' a panel decision is not binding.2 5 Parties may reject the
is

See, e.g.,

FLA. STAT. ANN.

768.4417(a) (West Supp. 1980), declared unconstitutional

Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-12 (1976); IDAHO
CODE §§ 6-1001 to 1013 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Supp. 1980); MD. Cts.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1980) (mandatory for claims of more than
$5,000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 538.020.1 (Vernon Supp. 1980), declared unconstitutional, Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for
Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 27-6-301,
701 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840(2) (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.070 (1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-15.A (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.101 (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.309 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81), declared unconstitutional, Mattos v.
Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977) (mandatory if either
party requests arbitration); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.001 to .27 (1980 & West Supp.
1980-81) (claimant's option to invoke panel).
19 Some states require parties to file with the court before engaging the MMP. A trial is
unavailable until the MMP proceeding is complete. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(a) (Supp.
1979) (within court's discretion to hear case without first submitting it to panel); ARIM. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6801-14 (Supp. 1978); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-4901 (Supp. 1979) (within court's discretion to hear case without first
submitting it to panel); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1, -2 (Supp. 1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3403 (Supp. 1979).
20 See, e.g., HAWAI REV. STAT. § 671-15 (1976 & Supp. 1978). Several states limit the
panel to three possible findings: (1) whether the defendant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care; (2) whether the defendant met the appropriate standard of
care; or (3) whether there is a material issue of fact bearing on liability to be decided by a
court or jury. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-09 (Supp. 1979).
21 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.536(c) (Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231,
§ 60B (West Supp. 1980) (panel to determine only whether evidence is "sufficient to raise a
legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41A.060
(1979).
22 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6811(b)(4) (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.47G(4) (West 1977).
23 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(8) (West Supp. 1980) (panel may fix damages only if both
parties agree), declared unconstitutional, Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-15(b) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-1004 (1979) (panel must find liability by unanimous agreement); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05 (1980); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.508a(9) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), declared unconstitutional, Mattos
v. Thompson, 42-1 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-7 (Supp. 1979).
24 See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2711.21 (Page Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81),
declared unconstitutional, Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
25 In some states, however, the medical malpractice panel's award may become binding
if neither party takes further action. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWs § 10-19-9a (Supp. 1978)
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panel's determination and obtain a trial de novo. Frequently,
however, statutes explicitly make MMP findings admissible into
evidence at subsequent trials.2 6
Some statutes require panel members to assist plaintiffs with
meritorious complaints by retaining expert witnesses for a later
trial. 27 Others prohibit panel members from testifying at the trial
de novo. 28 Finally, the statute of limitations on medical malprac29
tice claims may toll during the pendency of panel proceedings,
and a few states limit how long review proceedings may delay the
30
plaintiff from instituting suit.
MMP laws present formidable obstacles for claimants seeking
jury trials. In some states, a party requesting a trial de novo after
31
an MMP hearing must comply with stiff bonding requirements

("Any party who does not file a notice of rejection within the time set herein shall be
deemed conclusively to have accepted said findings or award.").
26 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567M (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.510 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81), declared unconstitutional, Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d
190 (Pa. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-8 (Supp. 1979). Maryland admits the panel's opinion into evidence at trial and accords it a presumption of correctness. MD. CTS. & JuD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (1980).
27 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(J) (Supp. 1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41A.090 (1979),
as amended by 1979 NEv. STATS. ch. 368, § 4.
28 See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 27-6-704 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3409
(Supp. 1979). Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4904(c) (Supp. 1979) (panel's report not admissible
in evidence, but panel members may be subpoenaed as witnesses).
29 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 27-6-702 (1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.9 (1977) (statute of
limitations tolled for longer of 120 days following notice of claim or 60 days following
panel's decision).
30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(4) (West Supp. 1980) (jurisdiction of panel ceases 10
months from date claim filed), declared unconstitutional, Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231
(Fla. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (1979) (panel retains jurisdiction for only 90 days from
date of commencement of proceedings).
31 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1980) (unsatisfied plaintiff required to file $2,000 bond payable to defendant if plaintiff fails to prevail in trial de
novo).
In Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949), the Court held that
the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) (RDA), compelled federal courts sitting
in diversity to give effect to state statutes requiring litigants to post bond before suing in
stockholders' derivative actions. That the RDA requires application in federal court of
bonding statutes, which arguably burden the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, suggests that
the RDA also compels application of MMP laws, which ostensibly burden diversity jurisdiction less. In Cohen, however, failure to post bond shut the doors of both the federal and
state courthouses. If MMPs are surrogates of the state courts, MMP statutes close only the
federal courthouse doors during the pendency of the panel proceedings. In so doing, this
MMP provision-but not the bonding requiment in Cohen-forces litigants into state courts,
thereby undermining the choice of forums federal diversity jurisdiction provides. See notes
62, 67-69, and accompanying text infra.
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Furthermore, an un-

favorable panel decision may pose an insurmountable barrier to
recovery when it is admitted into evidence or when panel members testify at the subsequent trial. Plaintiffs who are able to
invoke federal diversity jurisdiction,3 3 therefore, have a strong
incentive to bypass panel proceedings and litigate in federal court
from the outset.
II
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS

A. The Condition Precedent Approach
Some federal courts regard the MMP as a condition precedent to the cause of action, 34 and dismiss suits brought directly to
35
federal court for failure to state a claim. In Edelson v. Soricelli,
the Third Circuit held that Erie and its progeny require federal
36
courts sitting in diversity to enforce such conditions precedent.
32 See MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(e) (1980) (if trial verdict not more

favorable than panel's award, party rejecting award must pay costs of judicial proceeding);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6813 (Supp. 1980) (panel costs paid by same party assessed court
costs).

33 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States....
31 See, e.g., Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556, 557 (E.D. Tenn.
1975) (plaintiff must "allege the substantive law of the [forum] state ... showing that [she]
is entitled to relief..." and must "'aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed'.. .") (quoting in part FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2), 9(c) ). See also Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.
1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. La. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F.
Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F.
Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); Wells v. McCarthy,
432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Marquez v. Hahnemann Med. C. & Hosp., 435 F. Supp.
972 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
35 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). In Edelson, citizens of New Jersey and New York
brought separate suits against Pennsylvania health care providers in Pennsylvania federal
district court. The cases were consolidated on appeal. The district court dismissed one suit
under the authority of Marquez v. Hahnemann Med. C. & Hosp., 435 F. Supp. 972 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), and held that the state panel had exclusive primary jurisdiction in the other.
"Both dismissals were without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to file fresh complaints after
completing arbitration." Id. at 133.
36 See atso DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th
Cir. 1980) (relying on Edelson); Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 617 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir.

1981]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS

343

Like most courts that have scrutinized MMP laws, however, the
Edelson court failed to consider the nature of the panel, and thus
avoided analyzing whether applying an MMP statute in federal
37
court would conflict with the diversity jurisdiction statute.
The Edelson court dismissed two objections rooted in the Erie
doctrine to the application of state law in federal court: (1) that
because the state MMP law was merely procedural, Hanna v.
Plumer 38 enabled federal courts sitting in diversity to reject it; 39
and (2) that a balancing of federal and state interests under Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative40 required the federal court
to ignore the MMP statute. 4 1 The court held that the policies
underlying Erie and Hanna-preventing forum-shopping and insuring the equitable administration of justice 4 2-and the "Byrdbalance" 43 required the application of the MMP statute. Thus, the

1980) (per curiam) (citing Edelson and requiring that malpractice claim first be
brought before Maryland MMP). Cf Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1024, 1210-12 (3d Cir.
1980) (following Edelson and requiring that pendent malpractice claim be brought first
before Pennsylvania MMP).
3' See 610 F.2d at 142 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); Note, 93 HARV. L. REv., supra note 1, at
1566 ("unfortunate that ... majority did not respond to ... dissent's concern about ...
nature of ... panel...."). Although the court considered the relationship between MMP
statutes and the Federal judicial system, it focused on the effect of MMP's upon the Federal jury right, not upon the potential infringement of diversity jurisdiction. See 610 F.2d
at 139-40.
38

380 U.S. 460 (1965).

31 610 F.2d at 135.
40

356 U.S. 525 (1958).

41

Appellants argued that delays and disincentives to suit in the Pennsylvania MMP

program offended the federal interests in promptly adjudicating claims and maintaining an
appearance of fairness. Furthermore, they argued that the admissibility of MMP findings
in subsequent trials would prejudice juries and usurp their factfinding function, thereby
denying plaintiffs their right to trial by jury. 610 F.2d at 135, 139.
42 The court described these policies as "avoid[ing] having the outcome of a case depend on whether it was brought in a state or federal court and [permiting] the state legislatures to define the substantive rights of their citizens." 610 F.2d at 134 (quoting Marquez v.
Hahnemann Med. C. & Hosp., 435 F. Supp. 972, 974 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
4' The court distinguished Byrd. There, the court observed, (1) applying federal law
had near-constitutional significance; (2) the state law involved rested on no strong state
policy; and (3) the likelihood of a result under federal law differing from one under state
law was minimal. 610 F.2d at 138-40. The federal interest in not applying the MMP law,
however, was less compelling than the federal interest in Byrd. The court did not find the
delays caused by the program distressing and was confident that juries, assisted by special
masters, would not be prejudiced by panel findings. Id. at 140. But see Mattos v.
Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980) (excessive delay violated state constitutional
right to trial by jury). The court also emphasized the underlying state policy of
reducing the cost of malpractice insurance, although it admitted the panel system was a
"resounding flop." 610 F.2d at 136. The court observed that allowing diversity plaintiffs to
circumvent MMPs would afford them a right denied to state-court plaintiffs, thus directly
contravening the policies in Erie. Id. at 141.
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court concluded that plaintiffs had to comply with the MMP law
before asserting a valid claim in federal court."
B. Examination of the Panel's Nature
The District Court for the District of Rhode Island reached
the opposite result in Wheeler v. Shoemaker,15 holding that the
plaintiff was not required to submit his action to a Rhode Island
MMP 4 6 before bringing suit in federal court. Examining the legislative history and structure of the MMP law, the court concluded
that the Rhode Island legislature "intended the panel ... to function as an adjunct of the state court ratier than as an independent agency." 4 7 Furthermore, the court concluded that because
the panel hearing was likely to be the determinative adjudication
between the litigants, 48 deferring to the state MMP would be "tantamount to vesting original jurisdiction in [the] state court [system] and would defeat the purpose of the congressional grant of
diversity jurisdiction." 49 Thus, the Wheeler court refused to 5en0
force the MMP law, and accepted jurisdiction over the claim.
44 But see Note, 1980 DUKE L.J., supra note 1, at 554-67 (rejecting Edelson approach and
arguing no MMP law need be applied by federal courts because MMPs (1) are not bound
up or intimately involved with basic rights or obligations; (2) do not substantially affect the
ultimate determination of liability; and (3) frustrate strong federal interests in preserving
diversity jurisdiction).
45 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978) (Pettine, C.J.).
41 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to 10 (Supp. 1979).
47 78 F.R.D. at 221.
48 Id. at 222-23. Alternatively, the defendant argued that the federal court, if it accepted jurisdiction, must give effect to the state statutory scheme by appointing a federal
malpractice panel. The court disagreed. It explained that Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), allows federal courts to balance both federal and state interests
when deciding whether to apply state law in federal diversity actions. The court acknowledged that important state interests underlay the Rhode Island MMP law, but refused to
mimic the state procedure because of the significant federal interest in controlling the
administrative burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary. 78 F.R.D. at 227-29.
49 Id. at 222. See Turner, Medical Malpractice Arbitration on the Erie Railroad, 11 TOLEDO
L. REv. 1, 22-25 (1979) (approving Wheeler approach). But see Alexander, State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in FederalDiversity Actions, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 959, 997 (1979)
(Wheeler's conclusion that state MMP statute divested federal courts of jurisdiction erroneous because courts ultimately take jurisdiction in trial de novo).
No court has followed Wheeler's approach to MMP laws. Most cursorily distinguish the
case on two grounds: (1) that, unlike the typical panel statute, Rhode Island's MMP law
requires referral to a panel after filing an action in court, rather than completion of panel
proceedings prior to filing; and (2) that Wheeler involved a motion to refer rather than a
motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646, 648 n.2 (7th Cir.
1979) (construing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9. 5-9-1 to 10 (Burns Supp. 1980)); Woods v. Holy
Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979) (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44
(West Supp. 1980)); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D.
La. 1979). (construing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299. 41-48 (West Supp. 1980)). See note
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Similarly, Judge Rosenn, dissenting in Edelson, argued that
federal courts should not apply the Pennsylvania MMP law in diversity actions. 51 Judge Rosenn claimed that the Pennsylvania
MMP "is not an administrative body reviewing claims prior to
judicial action but its functions, powers, and procedures are those
' 52
of a judicial entity artfully draped in non-judicial garb."
Reasoning that "Pennsylvania ha[d] attempted to limit . .. residents and non-residents, at least in the first instance, to a
Pennsylvania court," 5 3 Judge Rosenn concluded that the Third
Circuit should disregard the Pennsylvania law.
III
THE PROPER METHODOLOGY

Courts should first investigate the extent to which an MMP
resembles a state court. A federal court cannot give effect to an
MMP law if it undermines the federal diversity jurisdiction statute; state law cannot apply in federal court when a federal statute
"otherwise require[s] or provide[s]." 54 If a court determines that
the MMP is closely akin to a judicial body, it should exercise diversity jurisdiction 55 and disregard the MMP statute as an im-

19 supra (state statutes requiring initial filing with the court). These distinctions are tenuous
because they place inordinate reliance on the procedural distinction between filing a claim
first with the panel clerk or the court clerk. See text accompanying note 87 infra. Moreover,
the court in Wheeler had the power to dismiss. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3); 5 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE & PROCEDURE §, 1350, at 545 (1969) ("Lack of subject

matter jurisdiction ... may be asserted at any time by the court, sua sponte, either at the
trial or appellate level.") (footnote omitted).
50 78 F.R.D. at 229.
51 Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 141-49 (3d Cir. 1979).
52 Id. at 142 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 145.

51 The RDA's command to absorb state law does not apply where "the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1976). Where application of a state statute emasculates the purposes of a federal
law, the federal statute clearly "requires or provides" that the federal court eschew the state
legislation. The treatment of such state legislation is identical under Erie because the command of the RDA is the same as that of the Erie doctrine. Erie "[tiechnically ... can be
viewed as an interpretation of the [RDA]." Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
797, 800 n.16 (1957).
55 Federal courts need not exercise jurisdiction when the requirements of the diversity
jurisdiction statute are met. Courts may refuse jurisdiction by invoking discretionary doctrines such as abstention, forum non conveniens, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. For a discussion of the exhaustion doctrine, see notes 101-10 and accompanying text
infra.
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permissible intrusion on federal jurisidiction.
Further balancing of
56
state and federal interests is unnecessary.
Analyzing the nature of the tribunal at the outset makes sense
for another reason. Even when the MMP does not actually undermine the diversity jurisdiction statute, the extent to which the
panel impairs the plaintiff's right to a choice of forum is an important federal concern. 5 7 Hence, the characterization of the
panel must be resolved before federal courts can adequately
balance the competing federal and state interests 58 in employing
MMP laws.
A. Undermining the Choice of Forums Under the Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction Statute
Traditionally, federal courts have zealously protected the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction. Although the exhaustion
of state administrative remedies doctrine generally requires them
to dismiss a suit if the plaintiff has not pursued state administrative relief, federal courts have long ignored laws that restrict the
trial of state claims to state courts.5 9 Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator60 is the watershed.
" See Note, 93 HARV. L. REV., supra note 1, at 1566. Of course, further discussion of
Erie becomes superfluous only if the state law undermines the diversity jurisdiction statute.
If the panel does not emasculate the plaintiff's choice of forums, a complete Erie analysis is
necessary to determine whether application of the MMP law is required.
- See notes 67-68 and accompanying text infra (diversity jurisdiction scheme affords
litigants a federal right to choice of forums). See Note, 1980 DUKE L.J., supra note 1, at
554-67 (arguing Erie balance will always reject state MMP laws).
5 See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Szantay v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1965); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78
F.R.D. 218, 224 (D.R.I. 1978); Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search
of the AppropriateDilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 367-72 (1977). But see Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 717 n.130 (1974) (Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965), displaced Byrd balancing analysis by articulating the twin concerns in Eriedeterrence of forum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the law). Professor Ely's view of Hanna, however, is arguably inapplicable when the validity of a rule
enacted under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976), is not in issue. See notes
117-21 and accompanying text infra.
"' See notes 98-109 and accompanying text infra. Early Supreme Court decisions held
that the Constitution guaranteed plaintiffs the right to sue defendants from other states in
federal courts; the Constitution prohibited any state limitation, however indirect, of federal
diversity jurisdiction. For example, in Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67 (1840), the
plaintiff sued a debtor's estate for payment of a note even though a state statute barred
actions after a state commission declared an estate insolvent. The Supreme Court upheld
plaintiff's right to sue:
The [diversity jurisdiction statute] carries out the constitutional right of a citizen
of one state to sue a citizen of another state in the Circuit Court of the United
States; and gives to the Circuit Court "original cognisance, concurrent with the
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In Whitton's Administrator, the state statute creating plaintiff's
cause of action vested exclusive jurisdiction in the state courts. In
dicta, the Supreme Court laid down a broad prohibition of any
state interference with diversity jurisdiction:
[State claims] cannot be withdrawn from the cognizance of [a]
Federal court by any provision of State legislation that it shall
only be enforced in a State court.... [I]t never has been pretended that limitations of this character could affect, in any
respect, the jurisdiction of the Federal court over such suits
where the citizenship of one of the parties was otherwise sufficient. Whenever a general rule as to property or personal
rights, or injuries to either, is established by State legislation, its
enforcement by a Federal court in a case between proper parties is a matter of course, and the jurisdiction of the court, in
61
such case, is not subject to State limitation.

Courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law, and in
equity"... It was certainly intended to give to suitors having a right to sue in
the Circuit Court remedies co-extensive with these rights.
Id. at 75. See also Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 429-30 (1868). The origin of the
concept of a constitutional right to sue may lie in dicta in Martin v. Hunter's Lesee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816). See Friendly, The HistoricBasis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV.
L. REv. 483, 506-07 (1928). See generally id. at 506-09.

Several Court opinions, however, dispelled the notion of a constitutional right to sue
defendants of diverse citizenship in federal court. For example, in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92
U.S. 10 (1875) the Court stated:
The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States shall
extend to "controversies between citizens of different states," as well as to cases
arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States; but the
conditions upon which the power shall be exercised, except so far as the original or appellate character of the jurisdiction is designated in the Constitution,
are matters of legislative direction.
Id. at 17. See also Turner v. Bank of America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799) (Congress may limit
federal diversity jurisdiction). Furthermore, after deciding Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), the Court reevaluated the Suydam rationale. Although proscribing state laws
limiting jurisdiction exclusively to state courts, the Court held that Erie requires federal
courts to respect state laws, such as that in Suydam, that deny the right to sue in any court.
See note 62 infra.

60 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871).
61Id. at 286. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions relied on Whitton's Administrator's
broad prohibition against any state interference with federal diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 151 U.S. 673 (1894); Mexican Cent. Ry. v.
Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1893); Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485 (1883); Kern v. Huidekoper, 103
U.S. 485 (1880); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874). After Erie's reinterpretation of the relationship between state and federal law, however, the continued authority of Whitton's Administrator was questioned.

In Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535 (1949), the Supreme Court held that Erie compelled federal courts to enforce
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Although the Court did not invoke the supremacy clause,62 later
cases invalidating intrusive state statutes 63 implicitly acknowledged
its importance. 4
state "door-closing" statutes, which barred suits in state court by designated parties or upon
certain state created rights. See, e.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 536 n.1
(1949) (state law prohibited foreign corporation failing to file power of attorney with state
from bringing action or suit in any state court); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 185
(1947) (state law forbade suits for deficiency judgments on notes). Cf Lapides v. Doner,
248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (state court would not hear cases involving the exercise
of control or management of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation). But see Szantay
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965) (federal diversity jurisdiction available
despite state door-closing statute denying state court jurisdiction over suits brought by nonresident against a foreign defendant on a foreign cause of action). Because a federal court
sitting in diversity is "in effect, only another court of the State," Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945), a state legislature's decision to close the doors of the state
courthouse will also close the doors of the federal courthouse. The question thus remained
whether Erie also required federal courts to honor state laws closing only federal courthouse doors by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in state courts.
Recent cases have answered this question in the negative: under Erie, state legislatures may not bar access to federal courts without also barring access to state courts. For
example, in Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961), Judge
Haynsworth stated:
To the extent it may be said that [Angel v. Bullington and Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co.] require a federal court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, it is
a rational development of the Erie doctrine and a requisite one if the result of
the litigation in the federal court is to be the same as in the state courts.... It
would be quite foreign to the Erie doctrine, however, to apply a state statute in
such a way as to deny all relief in a federal court to a non-resident plaintiff on
a cause of action which, clearly, the state courts would recognize and enforce.
Id. at 718. See also Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d
1320, 1324-25 (2d Cir. 1977); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268
F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1967).
62 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2.
3 In Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485 (1880), the Supreme Court first indicated that
the supremacy clause underlay the protection of federal diversity jurisdiction from state
interference in Whitton's Administrator. Responding to a motion to remand a case removed
to federal district court, the Supreme Court stated;
When the prerequisites for removal have been performed, the paramount law of
the land says that the case shall be removed.... [Nit provision of the State law,
no pecularity in the nature of the litigation which would forbid the United
States court from entertaining original jurisdiction, could prevent the removal,
provided the case fell within the terms of the statute for the removal of causes.
Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64 Courts have not interpreted MMP statutes themselves to require that federal courts
sitting in diversity defer to panels before adjudicating malpractice claims. Rather, the RDA
determines whether MMP laws apply in federal court. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78
F.R.D. 218, 220 n.4 (D.R.I. 1978) (declining to infer that Rhode Island MMP statute ousted
federal courts of jurisdiction); Byrnes v. Kirby, 453 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1978);
Austin v. Boston Univ. Hosp., 372 Mass. 654, 363 N.E.2d 515, 518-19 (Mass. 1977)
(whether MMP statutes apply in federal court solely a question of federal law).
However, if an MMP statute did command federal courts to defer to court-like state
panels, it would violate the supremacy clause. U.S. CorNsT. art. VI, cl.2. Forcing plaintiffs
who meet the requirements of the diversity jurisdiction statute into state judicial bodies
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Although both Judge Rosenn in Edelson and the Wheeler court
relied heavily on the rationale of Whitton's Administrator to justify
their refusal to enforce state MMP laws, the case is not entirely
apposite. Whitton's Administrator dealt with a statute vesting exclusive jurisdiction in state courts, whereas MMP statutes permit subsequent trials de novo. 65 MMP laws thus at most only deprive
federal courts of initial jurisidiction. Nonetheless, the purpose behind the diversity jurisdiction statute supports Whitton's Administrator's broad prohibition of any state interference with diversity
jurisdiction. Viewed in this context, it is unimportant whether a
would undermine the statute's purpose to confer a choice of forums. See notes 67-69 and
accompanying text supra. Under traditional supremacy clause "conflict" theory, see generally
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUm. L. REv. 623, passim (1975), a state law violates the Constitution when it "'stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'" Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Accord, Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
Although the Supreme Court has held that mere potential conflict between state legislation and effectuation of federal purposes will oust a state law, see San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (state law invalidated because of "potential
frustration of national purposes"); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1956)
(state law invalidated because of possibility of double punishments imposed by state and
federal judgments); Note, supra, at 636, recent cases indicate a movement toward requiring
actual and substantial conflict. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
440 U.S. 519, 539-40, 544-45 (1979); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 583
(1979) ("State family and family property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden."); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973)
(dictum) (substantial conflict). See generally Note, supra, at 646-49. Even under the stricter
test, however, a state law requiring claims to be brought to a state court before they may be
brought to a federal court certainly poses an "actual and substantial" conflict with the
choice of forums that Congress intended to confer through the diversity jurisdiction statute. Thus, if an MMP resembles a court, the federal court must ignore the state statute
and may take jurisdiction immediately if the requisites for diversity jurisdiction are satisfied.
Laws mandating initial proceedings in a nonjudicial panel, however, would not abrogate the federal choice of forums and thus not violate the supremacy clause. The choice of
forums under the diversity jurisdiction statute arises only after the claimant has fulfilled all
state conditions precedent to suit, to which the Erie doctrine gives effect in the absence of
countervailing federal interests. Such conditions precedent may include MMP statutes valid
under the Constitution. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra. Although MMP statutes do not
explicitly permit trials de novo in federal courts, courts refuse to interpret them as only
permitting trials in state courts. Indeed, the Rhode Island MMP statute provides that a
dissatisfied party may file suit "in the superior court" after notice of his rejection of panel
findings. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-9(b) (Supp. 1979). In Wheeler, the court declined to infer
that, by this language, the legislature intended to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.
78 F.R.D. at 220 n.4. See also Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 424 (N.D.
Ind. 1978). However, other laws do not easily permit interpretations favorable to federal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 680 2 (a) (Supp. 1978) ("The Superior Court
of the State shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions alleging health care malpractice.").
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state statute deprives the federal courts of initial jurisdiction or
deprives them of all jurisdiction.
Most commentators agree that Congress intended the diversity jurisdiction statute to afford parties of diverse citizenship an
impartial federal forum to which they can bring their claims, and
thereby avoid prejudice in local tribunals. 66 In short, the statute
confers a choice of forums on plaintiffs who meet certain requirements. 67 A state law that forces such a claimant to bring his
suit before a state judicial body abrogates this choice-even if it
68
permits a subsequent federal trial de novo.
B. Determining Whether an MMP More Closely Resembles an
Administrative Board or a Court
Because states cannot compel litigants satisfying federal diversity jurisdiction intially to bring suit in state courts, 69 it is crucial
for courts to determine if an MMP is a "state court." A state's
characterization of its tribunals as judicial, legislative, or administrative is not binding on the federal judiciary; federal courts
70
should independently investigate the nature of the state body.
In such investigations, however, courts have applied imprecise
standards.
Federal courts focus on various factors when deciding
whether an MMP is a judicial or administrative body. For example, in characterizing the Rhode Island MMP 7 a as judicial, the
Wheeler court emphasized that the presiding justice of the state
superior court appointed the panel members 72 and that claimants
73
had to file with the superior court rather than with the MMP.
Courts also place considerable weight upon the formality of panel
66 See generally Friendly, supra note 59, at 495-97.

67 See note 33 supra.
68 On the other hand, laws that bar suit upon a claim in any court, including state courts,
do not interfere with this choice of forums. If the state denies the right to sue upon a
state-created claim, it is as if the state has also abrogated the substantive right itself. The
diversity jurisdiction statute confers a choice of forums only where the state recognizes a
substantive cause of action. Moreover, were a federal court sitting in diversity to accept
jurisdiction where state courts could not, it would confer superior rights on federal plaintiffs and violate the equitable administration of the law mandated by Erie. See note 61
SUpra.
69 See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
'0 See, e.g., Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 477 (1890); Volkswagen de Puerto
Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Rel. Bd., 455 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v.
Pennsylvania Environ. Heating Bd., 377 F. Supp. 545, 553 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
71 R.I. GEN. LAWS §109-19-1 to -10 (Supp. 1979).
72 78 F.R.D. at 221.
73 Id.
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proceedings and the effect of panel findings in subsequent litigation. Both the Wheeler court and Judge Rosenn in Edelson stressed
that the state MMPs were bound by state statutory and common
law, 7 4 and that the MMP hearing would likely be the dispositive
litigation of a dispute, despite the availability of a trial de novo.75
Furthermore, both feared that a jury might accord panel findings
undue weight.76 Judge Rosenn also focused on the power of the
Pennsylvania MMP not only to determine factual issues, but also
to issue subpoenae, compel production of records, decide liability,
and assess damages. 77
In cases involving the removal jurisdiction statutes, which
permit litigants to remove to federal court any "civil action"
brought in a "State court," 78 courts have focused on still other
74 610 F.2d at 149 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); 78 F.R.D. at 222.
75 610 F.2d at 144-45 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); 78 F.R.D. at 222.
76 610 F.2d at 144-45 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); 78 F.R.D. at 222.
11 610 F.2d at 143. See also In re Silvies River, 199 F. 495, 502 (D. Ore. 1912) (considering power to adjudicate rights and award damages in defining "state court' in removal
statute'); Fuller v. County of Colfax, 14 F. 177, 178 (D. Neb. 1882) (considering power to
adjudicate rights and award damages in defining "state court" in removal statute).
78 Several federal statutes authorize the removal of actions from a "state court" to a
federal court. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) generally provides for removal in
federal question cases regardless of the parties' citizenship or residence and in diversity
cases in which no defendant is a citizen of the forum state. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976)
allows removal of actions involving various federal officers. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976) allows
any person "who is denied or cannot enforce" his "equal civil rights" in the state courts to
remove to federal court.
Judicial interpretations of "state court" in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) provide a helpful framework for determining whether an MMP constitutes a judicial body.
That statute and the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), share at least
one purpose: to provide an alternate forum to litigants unable to obtain an impartial trial
in the state courts. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra. Judicial interpretations of
"state court" as used in the other removal provisions, however, may be inappropriate
guides for evaluating the nature of MMPs because of different underlying policies.
Not only may cases removed under provisions other than 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) be
inapposite, but removal cases involving actions under different substantive statutes may not
provide helpful guidance. Consider, for example, three cases on which Judge Rosenn relied in his dissent in Edelson: Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 598 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979),
Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Labor Rel. Bd., 455 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972), and Tool
& Die Makers Lodge No. 78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
These cases alleged in part jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations (TaftHarley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), which states "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... may be brought in
any district court of the United Sates, having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." This statute
ensures the availability of a federal forum to administer the national labor laws. The strong
policies militating for a uniform system of labor relations may influence a court's interpretation of whether a tribunal is sufficiently court-like to permit removal to a federal forum.
Thus, the factors on which courts focus and the weight that courts accord them may render seemingly analogous issues inapplicable to evaluation of MMPs.
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aspects to determine whether state tribunals are court-like. In the
removal context, federal courts have inquired whether a state
body was a "court of record" under state law, 79 whether the state
constitution incorporated the tribunal into the state judicial system,8 0 and whether adverse parties were involved.8t Some courts
have found state tribunals more like courts than administrative
bodies when the "locus of traditional jurisdiction" over the particular subject matter lay in the state courts. 82 Other courts applying the removal statutes have found telling signs of judicial
functions when the state body can enforce its rulings in the state
court system but lacks legislative or rulemaking duties typical of
83
administrative agencies.
The difficulty in ascertaining definitive standards for distinguishing judicial from nonjudicial bodies results from several factors: the innumerable state tribunals have unique attributes, cases
arise in many different procedural settings, and disputes are
based on different underlying claims for relief. Consequently,
federal courts can only determine whether MMPs possess sufficient judicial qualities to undermine the diversity jurisdiction
statute on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the process of characterizing a panel cannot be reduced to a mathematical equation;
the decision whether an MMP has usurped the plaintiff's choice
" See, e.g., Cappetta v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 12 F. Supp. 89, 90 (D. Conn. 1935) (justice of
the peace a "court of record" when performing duties; hence, action removable).
80 See, e.g., Katz v. Herschel Mfg. Co., 150 F. 684, 685 (D. Neb. 1906) (justice of peace
a "court" for removal purposes because state constitution vests judicial power in the office).
81 See, e.g., Commissioners of Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257
U.S. 547, 557 (1922) (county court a "state court" under removal statute where there are
"adversary parties and an issue in which the claim of one of the parties against the .other
capable of pecuniary estimation, is stated and answered in some form of pleading, and is to
be determined.").
82 See, e.g., Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979); Volkswagen de
Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Rel. Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1972).
8" See, e.g, Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Rel. Bd., 454 F.2d 38,
44 (1st Cir. 1972) (considering panel's lack of legislative duties); Tool & Die Makers Lodge
No. 78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (considering panel's
ability to enforce rulings through state courts). See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
211 U.S. 210 (1908) (appeal of injunction under statute prohibiting federal court from
enjoining "state courts"). In Prentis, the Supreme Court distinguished judicial from legislative activity:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.... Legislation
on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions....
Proceedings legislative in nature are not proceedings in a court.., no matter what may be the general or dominant character of the body in which they
may take place.
Id. at 226 (citiations omitted).
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of forums involves a subjective balancing of qualitative factors.
Thus, this Note isolates the margins: those criteria that are particularly accurate or especially unreliable indicators of a panel's
nature.
Two factors are generally unreliable. First, courts should not
inquire whether a state legislature intended the MMP to function
as "an adjunct of the state court" system. 84 The federal courts
have traditionally reserved for themselves the right to characterize
the nature of a state tribunal. 85 Furthermore, a state's label is
irrelevant; a state law that interferes with the full effectuation of a
federal statutory scheme cannot be applied in federal court86
regardless of the state legislature's intent.
Second, courts should not consider the procedural format or
the mode of access to an MMP to be dispositive of its nature.
Courts should accord little weight to whether judicial rules of evidence govern a panel hearing or whether parties initially file with
a panel or with a state superior court. Otherwise, state legislatures
could deprive plaintiffs of a choice of forums by merely endowing
an MMP with its own procedure.8 7
Federal courts should accord significant weight to other
criteria when characterizing an MMP. First, courts should inquire
88
whether a panel resembles a component of the state judiciary.
If a state judge presides over the panel and interprets questions
of law, 89 the panel proceeding mirrors a mandatory pre-trial conference within the state court system. If a lawyer serves as an officer of the court to guide medical professionals chosen for their
expertise,9 0 the panel parallels mandatory referral to a special
master.

'4 See Wheeler

v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 221 (D.R.I. 1978).
85 See note 70 and accompanying text supra. Because federal jurisdiction is a question
of federal law, the states' label for a tribunal should not govern the federal court's determination of whether the state body ousts it of jurisdiction.
86 One can persuasively argue, however, that federal courts should automatically refuse
to apply MMP statutes if the state legislature clearly intended to create a judicial body. If
legislative intent is clear, a court should not risk erroneously characterizing a panel, thus
depriving a claimant of his right to choose between federal and state forums. This federal
right to choose may be sufficiently important to justify such a prophylactic rule.
"I The court in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 221 (D.R.I. 1978), wisely accorded limited weight to procedure when analyzing the nature of the Rhode Island MMP.
But see Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d. 1164, 1169 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing statute requiring filing in court before action is referred to panel from statute requiring referral to panel before filing in court).
88 State laws labelling a tribunal a "court of record" or state constitutions expressly
placing a tribunal within the state judicial framework may be reliable indications that the
state body is judicial. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
89 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
0 See R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-19-1 (Supp. 1979).
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The panel's power to bind the parties is a second important
consideration in characterizing MMPs. A panel's decision hardly
constitutes an adjudication that usurps a claimant's choice of
forums if its decision has no effect on subsequent litigation. But it
increasingly resembles a court as its ability to determine parties'
rights grows. Although the availability of a trial de novo after an
MMP hearing ostensibly robs the panel of such effect, many states
expressly allow the panel's decision into evidence at trial. 91 One
state even requires a presumption that the panel's finding is correct. 92 Furthermore, after the statute of limitations for contesting
a panel's decision has run, some states allow the victorious party
to execute the award, thus giving the decision the force of a
judgment. 93 Finally, those MMPs empowered to determine the
merits of a controversy, fix liability, and award damages9 4 are
5
more judicial than those only having the authority to find facts.9
When determining the nature of a state agency, federal
courts might analyze whether the locus of traditional jurisdiction
over claims brought before a panel is in the state courts. Because
malpractice claims are tort actions, and the traditional locus of
jurisdiction of tort claims is in the state judiciary, however, MMPs
will always be court-like under this criteria. Merely examining the
original forum for tort claims does not suffice to characterize an
MMP as judicial.
Many criteria may assist a federal court's determination of
whether a panel more resembles a court than an administrative
7
board .:6 Certain factors, however, have limited usefulness.'

91 See note 26 supra.
92 MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-6(d) (1980).
11 See, e.g., id. § 3-2A-05 to -06 (award binding on the parties unless notice of rejection

and action to nullify award filed within 90 day period); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.511
(Purdon Supp. 1980-8 1) ("If an appeal is not entered within the prescribed time, the party
in whose favor the award shall have been made may ...transfer the record and judgment
to the court ... for execution."), declared unconstitutional, Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d

190 (Pa. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-9a (Supp. 1979) ("Any party who does not
file a notice of rejection within [thirty days of receipt of the award] shall be deemed

conclusively to have accepted said findings or award."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.20 (1980)
("After the ... time for petitioning the circuit court for a trial ... has passed, any party
may file a certified copy of the order containing the award ... and the court shall then

render judgment in accordance with the order.").
94 See notes 22, 23 and accompanying text supra.
95 See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
96 See notes 89-95 and accompanying text supra.
91 See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra. Courts should give little weight to
certain characteristics of MMPs that are judicial in form. For example, both court and
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Because no criterion is determinative, courts should analyze a
panel's composition and all its procedures, powers and duties in
determining whether an MMP usurps the choice of initial forums
federal diversity jurisdiction provides.
C. Completion of the Erie Analysis and the Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies Doctrine
If a federal court determines that an MMP resembles an administrative body more than a court, and thus does not undermine federal diversity jurisdiction, it must determine whether to
exercise jurisdiction or to dismiss the suit and defer to the MMP.
Although the court might 9 8 proceed under either the exhaustion
of state administrative remedies doctrine, 99 or continue under Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 100 and its progeny, 0°1 the applicability of the
panel proceedings involve adverse parties and usually result in a written opinion based on
independent investigation of facts and law. Many state administrative agencies, to which
federal courts regularly defer under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine,
also exhibit these attributes. Invalidating an MMP law on the basis of such factors would
expose almost every state agency to attack. But see Note, 1980 DUKE L.J., supra note 1, at
565.
Similarly, courts should ignore the burden on the right to choose a federal forum
resulting from costs, delays, and possible prejudice within an MMP system. But cf Edelson
v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 1979) (Rosenn, J., dissenting ) (possible prejudice,
"additional expenses," and inefficiency are important in analyzing federal interest not to
defer to panel). Almost every state administrative hearing arguably entails sufficient expense and delay to deter claimants from exercising their right to a federal forum.
Moreover, the potential for prejudice against noncitizens in state forums is always present.
If delay, costs, and potential prejudice burdened the right of access to a federal forum,
federal courts would seldom defer to any state administrative body under the exhaustion
doctrine.
98 Courts have not considered the exhaustion of state administrative remedies doctrine
when determining whether to give effect to MMP statutes. Most courts look exclusively to
the command of Erie. See. e.g., Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778 (1978), aff'd per
curiam, 617 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1978); Hamiliton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1208-12 (3d
Cir. 1980); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Wheeler v. Shoemaker,
78 F.R.D. 218, 222-23 (D.R.I. 1978) (focusing on nature of panel as administrative or
judicial).
"9See generally Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51
IND. L.J. 817, 859-911 (1976).
100 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
101A determination that a MMP statute undermines a claimant's choice of forums obviates further analysis of the state statute; the court should immediately take jurisdiction.
At least one federal court, however, has refused to defer to a court-like MMP-implicitly
on grounds that the MMP undermined federal diversity jurisdiction-but went on to consider whether the Erie doctrine required it to pattern the federal proceeding according to
the state MMP statute. See Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 223-29 (D.R.I. 1978).
This approach is incorrect. If an MMP statute is constitutionally infirm, the statute should
not affect a federal court's procedure. The RDA as interpreted by Erie and its progeny, see
notes 111-12 infra, does not compel application of state law where "the Constitution ...
otherwise require[s) or provide[s]." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). See note 54 supra.
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exhaustion doctrine is unnecessary where state statutes require
administrative proceedings. Moreover, because of the statutory
basis of the Erie doctrine, logic requires that courts analyze exclusively the command of Erie and its progeny.
Exhaustion is a discretionary doctrine that generally requires 102 federal courts to dismiss or stay suits when the plaintiff
has not pursued applicable state administrative remedies before
seeking federal relief.1 0 3 Generally applied to state statutes that
do not require exhaustion, 10 4 the doctrine is not a limitation on
federal jurisdiction.' 0 5 Rather, the exhaustion requirement is
rooted in equitable discretion,10 6 reflecting federalism concerns 107
102 Exhaustion, however, is unnecessary in several situations, such as when the state remedy is inadequate. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 49, at
211 (3d ed. 1976). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01-.10 (1958

& Supp. 1970).
103 Myers v. Bethlehem Ship Bldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); C. WRIGHT, supra
note 102, at 210.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) is the seminal state exhaustion
doctrine case. The defendant, Virginia State Corporation Commission, appealed a federal
injunction against enforcing an allegedly confiscatory order fixing railroad transportation
rates. Id. at 223. The Court dismissed the defendant's argument that, because the commission was a "court," federal courts lacked power to enjoin it under the Anti-Injunction Act
of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (current version with substantive modifications at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1976)) 211 U.S. at 223-28. However, the Court held that the plaintiff railroad had
appealed the Commission's rate order to the federal courts prematurely because Virginia
provided an appeal of right from any rate order to its own supreme court. Id. at 230-31.
"The question to be decided ... is legislative, whether a certain rule shall be made. Although the appeal [to the state supreme court] is given of right, it is not a remedy, properly so called. At that time, no case exists." Id. at 229. The Court reasoned that deferral to
the state proceeding might save the federal courts time and expense if the state itself
found the Commission's rate to be confiscatory, thus rendering federal relief unnecessary.
See id. at 231.
The Court narrowed the apparent scope of the Prentis exhaustion doctrine in Bacon v.
Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914), by holding that parties must exhaust only nonjudicial
remedies. Emphasizing that the Virginia Supreme Court in Prentis would have exercised
only "legislative" powers in a rate-order appeal, the Court held that "at the judicial stage
[an aggrieved party has] a right to resort to the courts of the United States at once." Id. at
137.
Although Bacon and Prentis involved exhaustion of state legislative remedies, they are
commonly interpreted to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies as well. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 102, at 210 ("A litigant must normally exhaust state 'legislative' or
'administrative' remedies ... ").
104 See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 (1973) (dictum); Timmons v. Andrews,
538 F.2d 584. 586 (4th Cir. 1976); Guzzard v. Local Lodge 1040, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir.
1973).
C. WRIGHT, supra note 102, at 210.
106 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908) (exhaustion of state
105

legislative remedies); P.

BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 980 (2d ed. 1973) ("traditional

discretion of the chancellor . .. mother of [exhaustion] doctrin[e]").
107 See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 425 (1965). Raoul Berger

has argued, however, that comity was a significant rationale only for the exhaustion of state
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0 8
By reand an interest in judicial convenience and efficiency.'
statefor
solicitude
show
courts
quiring exhaustion, the federal
10 9
gain
and
created mediation procedures, reduce court dockets,
the advantage of an administrative record enhanced by the agency's expertise." 0 Unlike the exhaustion doctrine, however, the
Erie doctrine is based on the command of a statute, the Rules of
Decision Act (RDA),"' and of the Constitution." 2

legislative remedies. He states that "the earlier applications of the [exhaustion doctrine] ...
to state administrative bodies were based not so much upon considerations of comity as
upon the theory that resort to equity is premature in the absence of administrative action,
or so long as some other remedy is available." Berger, Exhaustion of State Administrative
Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981, 985 (1939) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the exhaustion of legislative remedy in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), see
note 103 supra.
...See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908) (exhaustion of state
legislative remedies).
1o' See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); Seepe v. Department of Navy,
518 F.2d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 1975); Penzoil Co. v. Department of Energy, 466 F. Supp. 238,
244 (D. Del. 1979).
"' American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 909, 913 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (Cost of Living Council); Bralley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410, 415
(1st Cir. 1973) (Food & Drug Administration).
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). The Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." Commentators generally agree that Erie and its
progeny interpret the RDA -at least where federal rules that are "arguably procedural"
are involved. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 58, at 698, 706; Mishkin, supra note 54; Redish &
Phillips, supra note 58, at 358-61; cf. Alexander, supra note 49, at 975 ("Opinions subsequent to Erie have focused not on ... constitutional limitations on federal courts, but
rather on the limitations imposed by the Rules of Decision Act .. ").But see Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 386 (1964)
("[Tihe constitutional ground taken in Erie was precisely the right ground-indeed, the
only tenable one").
112 In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court stated:
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be
prepared to abandon [the] doctrine [of Swift v. Tyson] so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued
has now been made clear and compels us to do so.
... There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be
local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law
of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.
Id. at 77-78 (footnote omitted). The federal courts have no constitutional power to engage
in general substantive lawmaking in diversity actions. However, the grant of diversity jurisdiction in article III of the Constitution does empower the federal judiciary to regulate its
own procedure. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Ely, supra note 58,
at 698, 703 n.62, 706; Friendly, supra note 111, at 402-03; Redish & Phillips, supra note 58,
at 358. Professor Ely states that Congress and the courts (through congressional delegation)
have constitutional power to create rules as long as they are not "plainly unprocedural."
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Erie and its progeny require federal courts sitting in diversity
to give effect to a state's substantive law regulating the primary
conduct of its citizens.' 1 3 Courts and commentators disagree,
however, about the effect that federal courts must give to state
rules that are not clearly substantive. The controversy stems from
conflicting interpretations of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative.1 4 One interpretation of Byrd is that, in the absence
of a clearly applicable federal rule of procedure, a federal court
must honor state procedural rules that are intimately "bound up"
with substantive state policies.' ' 5 Another interpretation is that
Byrd requires federal courts to engage in a free-form balancing
process when determining whether to follow state rules that are
arguably not substantive."'
Under this approach, the court balances both the state interests in promoting state substantive policies
and the litigants' interests in not having the outcome of a suit be

Ely, supra note 58, at 705. Ely thus argues that the RDA restricts the federal courts' constitutional power to ignore state law in arguably procedural matters:
The United States Constitution ... constitutes the relevant text only where
Congress has passed a statute creating law for diversity actions, and it is in this
situation alone that Hanna's "arguably procedural" test controls. Where a
nonstatutory rule is involved, the Constitution necessarily remains in the
background, but is functionally irrelevant because the applicable statutes are
significantly more protective of the prerogatives of state law.
Id. at 698. See id. at 705, 720; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra
note 106, at 120 (Supp. 1977). Accord, Redish & Phillips, supra note 58, at 358. When no
federal statute or rule of procedure controls, the RDA requires application of the state law
if applying federal law would probably produce a different outcome or unfairness to the
litigants. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965); Ely, supra note 58, at 712, 714, 722.
Thus, Ely argues that the constitutional component in Erie is "functionally irrelevant" in all
cases that do not involve clear substantive issues. Id. at 698, 706. See generally, C. WRIGHT,
supra note 102, § 56, at 258-62.
The arguably procedural character of MMPs, see Note, 93 HARV. L. REV., supra note 1,
at 1569-70, satisfies the constitutional component of Erie. However, if MMPs were held to
be clearly substantive, the Constitution, absent a contrary congressional statement, would
compel their application in federal courts sitting in diversity. The rub, then, would be
whether federal diversity jurisdiction constitutes such a congressional statement.
"' "Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling
the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give
rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs." Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
14 356 U.S. 525 (1958). For a discussion of Byrd's application to MMPs, see Alexander,
supra note 49, at 981-87; Note, 1980 DUKE L.J. supra note 1, at 556-62.
11 Redish & Phillips, supra note 58, at 364.
16 Id. The court in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978) adopted this
flexible balancing test. "The interpretation this Court prefers is that Byrd counsels a balancing of the federal interest even if a significant state interest is "bound up" with [a] state
statute." Id. at 225 n.9.
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determined by the "accident of diversity of citizenship" 11 7 against
the countervailing federal interests in applying federal law. A
third interpretation is that the emphasis upon the twin aims of
Erie in Hanna v. Plumer 118 displaced the "balancing of federal and
state interests contemplated by the Byrd opinion." l 9 This view,
however, must be tempered by the facts in Hanna, where a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was at issue. Any rejection of Byrd by
Hanna, therefore, is arguably confined 120 to an analysis of Federal
2
Rules enacted under the Rules Enabling Act.' 1
Logic dictates that federal courts analyze MMP statutes exclusively under the Erie doctrine. On the one hand, a determination
that federal interests under Byrd are insufficient to override the
absorption of state law would nullify a contrary command of the
exhaustion doctrine. Even if a malpractice suit were to fall into
12 2
one of the narrow exceptions to the exhaustion requirement,
the RDA still requires the court to defer to the panel. On the
other hand, a conclusion that federal interests require the federal
court to ignore state law and immediately take jurisdiction accounts for and dismisses the policies underlying the exhaustion
doctrine. If a court decides that Byrd requires a federal rule of
decision, it at least implicitly balances the exhaustion rule's concerns for federalism, convenience, and administrative expertise
117

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (in diversity cases

federal courts must follow conflicts of laws rules of the forum state).
118 380 U.S. 460 (1965).

119Ely, supra note 58, at 717 n.130. See 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. Ely notes, however, that "if
the 'federal interest' involved is one whose recognition is required by the United States
Constitution ... it should be honored regardless of what the Rules of Decision Act might
otherwise imply." Ely, supra note 58, at 717 n.130. Cf. note 54 supra (arguing that RDA
analysis would reject state law violating the Constitution).
120 Despite contrary statements elsewhere (see Ely, supra note 58, at 707-18), Professor
Ely implicitly suggests a limitation on Hanna's review of Byrd by his reliance on Professor Miller's article, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law:
Death Knellfor a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 613, 714-15 (1962); Ely, supra note 58,
at 717 n.130. The topic sentence of the paragraph in Professor Miller's article, that Professor Ely quotes, begins: "Hanna seems to require that a federal court confronted with a challenge to a Federal Rule...." Miller, supra, at 714 (emphasis added). Thus, Professor Miller's
discussion of Hanna's effect on Byrd is confined to a challenge to a federal rule enacted
under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2077 (1976). Cf. Miller, supra, at 715 n.375
(suggesting Hanna permits balancing of interests when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in
question). But see Redish & Phillips, supra note 58, at 368-69 (Hannarejected Byrd-balance).
Whatever the view of the commentators, however, federal courts continue to balance
federal and state interests when determining choice of law in diversity actions. See Redish
& Phillips, supra note 58, at 369 n.74 ("decisions from all circuits but the Ninth ... [continue to apply] Byrd."). See generally id. at 369-72.
121 28 U.S.C. § 2077 (1976).
122 See note 102 supra.
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against other contrary and weightier federal interests. Thus, regardless of the outcome under the Erie doctrine, the command of
123
the exhaustion doctrine is irrelevant.
CONCLUSION

Federal courts confronted with attempts to avoid state MMPs
should engage in an Erie analysis to determine the applicability of
the state MMP statute. To do so, courts must initially characterize
the nature of the panel to determine whether the MMP law abrogates the choice of forums federal diversity jurisdiction provides.
Only if the state law is compatible with diversity jurisdiction
should federal courts complete the Erie analysis. Because the
policies underlying the exhaustion of state administrative remedies are subsumed in an Erie balance of federal and state interests, independent consideration of the exhaustion doctrine is
unnecessary. The outcome under an Erie analysis, therefore, will
settle the issue.
David L. Bishop

123

Other reasons also suggest that a court should analyze the requirements of the Erie

doctrine exclusively. The exhaustion doctrine may not even apply to MMP statutes. The
doctrine commonly applies where state statutes do not make administrative proceedings a
condition precedent to suit. See note 104 supra. In addition, the federal interest in administrative expertise underlying the exhaustion docrine, see note 110 and accompanying text
supra, is not necessarily promoted by deferring to an MMP. Random procedures in many
states for selecting MMP personnel substantially prevent panel members from developing
expertise.

